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Abstract. JavaCard is a multi-application security platform deployed to over
twenty billion smartcards, used in applications ranging from secure payments
to telecommunications. While the platform is a popular choice for established
commercial use cases (e.g., SIM cards in telecommunication networks), it
has notably low adoption rates in: 1) application scenarios requiring recently-
standardized cryptographic algorithms, 2) research projects, and 3) open
source initiatives. We attribute this to the restricted access to low-level crypto-
graphic primitives (e.g., elliptic curve operations) and the lack of essential data
types (e.g., Integers). While the underlying hardware has those capabilities,
the JavaCard API does not provide calls for the corresponding function-
ality. Until now, the only available workaround was manufacturer-specific
proprietary APIs that come with very restrictive non-disclosure agreements.
In this paper, we introduce a methodology to efficiently derive essential data
types and low-level cryptographic primitives from high-level operations. Our
techniques are ideal for resource-constrained platforms, and make optimal use
of the underlying hardware, while having a small memory footprint. We also
introduce JCMathLib, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first generic
library for low-level cryptographic operations in JavaCards that does not
rely on a proprietary API. Without any disclosure limitations, JCMathLib
enables open code sharing, release of research prototypes and public and
third-party code audits.
Keywords: Cryptography, Elliptic Curves, Big Integers, JavaCard
1 Introduction
Smartcards were a breakthrough in the secure hardware world as they provided
a relatively inexpensive platform that stores and computes over secrets securely
while operating under adversarial control. At first, each hardware manufacturer
maintained its platform that applications were compiled against. However, the need
for cross-manufacturer interoperability eventually led to the formation of JavaCard
platform [16]. JavaCard is a multi-application platform that promises full application
portability between manufacturers. This fueled the adoption of the platform, and its
popularity steadily rose over the years; until 2017 more than 20 billions of JavaCards
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have been sold [10]. Common applications include telecommunications (e.g., SIM
cards), payments, and loyalty cards. Additionally, new use cases emerged as Internet-
of-Things (IoT) vendors seek secure hardware components for their devices [27,12,3,6].
In practice, interoperability is achieved through the JavaCard Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API), and the specification of the JavaCard runtime environment
(JCRE) executing interoperable bytecode. The API is available in all JavaCards re-
gardless of their manufacturer and is maintained by Oracle [16], which periodically
(approximately every three years) releases updates with JC 3.0.5 being the latest
[17]. JavaCard developers use the algorithms and the convenience functions it ex-
poses in their applets, without any need to manage the underlying hardware (i.e.,
cryptographic coprocessor, secure parts of the memory). For instance, to use the
Digital Signature Algorithm over Elliptic Curves (ECDSA), JavaCard developers can
simply initialize a crypto engine with ECDSA. Behind the scenes, a hardware imple-
mentation of the algorithm is executed in the cryptographic coprocessor of the card,
while all secrets are stored in a safe section of the memory. Such hardware-supported
implementations of popular algorithms are very convenient for developers as they are
much faster than their software-only counterparts and provide additional protection
against side-channel and fault-induction attacks.
However, this reliance on the high-level API comes at a price. Developers do
not have direct access to the underlying cryptographic components (e.g., crypto
coprocessor) and rely solely on the API for the functionality they need. While the
JavaCard API supports a range of common cryptographic algorithms, it cannot
sufficiently cover the wealth of crypto schemes that are currently used in production.
This results in many popular or modern algorithms not being available in JavaCards
(e.g., El-Gamal [7], Schnorr [22] or many Authenticated Encryption algorithms [2])
and thus hinders the adoption of JavaCards in novel applications. To address these
limitations, many manufacturers provide proprietary APIs that give some degree of
freedom to developers to implement unsupported schemes themselves. However, since
those APIs are manufacturer-specific, their use severely hinders interoperability. More
importantly, the legal limitations proprietary APIs come with, make them unsuitable
for many applications such as reproducible research, public code audits, application
prototypes, and open source projects. In practice, proprietary APIs prohibit all
applications that require any source code to be publicly released or shared.
This paper proposes a solution that goes beyond manufacturer solutions and
is based solely on functionality provided by the standard API. At a first glance,
implementing new functionality in software may look straightforward. However,
resource-constrained platforms do not have neither the processing power, nor the
memory capacity to support such implementations. To overcome these limitations,
we introduce a new approach that makes optimal use of the platform’s resources
(e.g., memory, hardware-acceleration chips). We design various transformations that
given a restricted set of high-level cryptographic operations, can be used to realise
essential low-level operations and fundamental data types. More specifically, our
transformations combine existing high-level hardware-accelerated operations (e.g.,
crypto-coprocessor for ECDSA), into new operations, data types and objects such
as Integers, BigNumbers, EC Points, Modular arithmetic, Elliptic curve operations.
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To evaluate the practicality of our approach and its performance, we build a library
called JCMathLib, which realizes several data types and primitives that are currently
not supported by the JavaCard API. The JavaCard platform is an ideal testbed, as
it has a very restrictive API and limited processing resources.
Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
v Transformations for primitive derivation. We introduce a complete set of
operation transformations that combine high-level cryptographic operations to
reconstruct low-level ones. Our transformations cover all fundamental crypto-
graphic primitives, needed for implementing any modern scheme, and span from
simple Integer operations to resource-demanding elliptic curve points operations.
v Open-source cryptographic library. To the best of our knowledge,
JCMathLib is the first open source library for JavaCards that realizes essential
Integer, BigNumber, and primitive Elliptic Curve operations without the use
of any proprietary APIs. This will enable developers to publicly share parts of
their code (e.g., research prototypes, code audits).
v Performance optimizations and evaluation. The library’s performance
is extensively optimized and evaluated on various cryptographic smartcards.
The BigNumber operations are executed faster than reported in previous
works [25], while even the most computationally-intense EC Point operations
complete in 4 seconds or less. JCMathLib requires only 1KB of RAM in the
performance-optimized version, while can also accommodate low-end cards with
less RAM by moving part of its state from the RAM into the EEPROM.
The paper is organized as follows: We first provide some preliminary information
on how the JavaCard ecosystem operates and its shortcomings in the development
and adoption in new application areas. Then, we introduce a set of transformations
that realize commonly missing functionality in resource-constrained platforms, and
present JCMathLib, a library, that implements all these transformations for the
JavaCard platform. Finally, we evaluate and discuss the performance, security and
limitations of our library.
2 Preliminaries
Smartcards are small embedded devices used in a wide range of applications that
require secure storage, access control, and/or authentication. Initially, smartcards were
cumbersome to program and manage as the functionality had to be loaded by the
manufacturer at the time of the fabrication. This changed with multi-application cards
supporting dynamic loading of multiple binaries. Building on top of this, JavaCard
then introduced binary interoperability between different cards and manufacturers,
thus increasing smartcard adoption even further. In this section, we first provide
an overview of the JavaCard ecosystem processes, and then examine the JavaCard
development and API.
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JavaCard Specification. JavaCard holds the largest chunk of the programmable
smartcard market with more than 20 billion units deployed in production [10,15]. To
guarantee manufacturer interoperability, Oracle periodically releases the specifica-
tions of the JavaCard API (JC API), the JavaCard Virtual Machine (JCVM), and
the JavaCard Runtime Environment (JCRE) [16]. The JCVM aims to isolate the
user applications from the underlying hardware and operating system, while the JC
API exposes JavaCard packages and classes to user applications. Manufacturers are
responsible for implementing these specifications in their products and perform audits
to ensure the security of the final product. The most recent version of the specification
is JC 3.0.5 (published in 2015), while the oldest specification available online is JC
2.1 (published in 1999). Starting from JC 3.x, the specification distinguishes between
two significantly different APIs – the classic and the connected editions. The classic
edition further extends the capabilities of the JC 2.x versions but does not differ con-
ceptually from previous versions. On the other hand, the connected edition introduces
smartcards exposing web-service interfaces accepting XML requests. While the classic
edition is widely used, the connected edition has yet to appear in commercial cards.
JavaCard Development. Even though JavaCard is a subset of Java, it comes
with severe limitations that are mainly due to the low capabilities of the card’s
hardware. In particular, most of the standard Java packages have been stripped away
and new packages have been added to support selected cryptographic operations
and basic data transmission functions. Moreover, several standard Java features are
missing (e.g., threads, dynamic class loading, and object cloning), while the JCVM
specification further restricts the maximum number of classes to 15 and methods
to 128 to make bytecode more compact. From a technical perspective, JavaCard
applet compilation is straightforward. Applets are compiled using ordinary Java tools
(i.e., javac compiler) configured to link the JavaCard packages. The produced Java
bytecode is then processed and checked for compliance by a JavaCard converter
and if successful, is turned into JavaCard bytecode. The final binary is then up-
loaded and installed to the card, usually via the GlobalPlatform interface [8]. To
prevent potential security issues, JavaCard will refuse to load an applet that has
been processed using a converter complying with a newer version of the JavaCard
SDK. For instance, a smartcard shipped with JCVM 3.0.1 cannot load an applet
converted using JCSDK 3.0.5, even if only packages and classes defined in 3.0.1 are
used.
JavaCard API. JavaCards expose their functionality through various specialized
packages that are part of the standard API. In total, there are only 19 packages
defined by the JC 3.0.5 API. Table 1 lists the packages that contain common high-level
cryptographic operations, while there are also specialized packages for biometric au-
thentication and remote method invocation. For performance reasons, the majority of
those cryptographic algorithms are implemented in specialized hardware components
(i.e., dedicated crypto-coprocessors).
JavaCard is notably slow in adopting modern schemes (or even variants of existing
ones) and thus developers are often faced with the challenge of implementing unsup-
ported schemes by themselves. Without access to the underlying hardware, developers
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Package Functionality
javacardx.crypto.Cipher Symmetric Encryption Schemes
javacard.crypto.Signature Asymmetric Signing Schemes
javacard.security.MessageDigest Cryptographic Hash Functions
javacard.security.RandomData Random Number Generators
javacard.security.KeyAgreement Key Agreement Algorithms
javacard.security.KeyBuilder Key Generation
javacard.security.KeyPair Key Pair Storage
Table 1. List of JavaCard packages that provide cryptographic functionality.
can only build their schemes in software. However, such implementations are rarely
usable, as they are constrained both by the limited amount of RAM, and the CPU’s
meager performance. For example, a hardware-accelerated implementation of AES
takes less than 2ms to execute, while a software re-implementation requires more than
500ms 3. A solution to this problem could be the use of the javacardx.framework.math
package, specifying the BigNumber class with hardware-accelerated add and multiply
operations. However, manufacturers are not obligated to support all the packages
and classes listed in the specification, and BigNumber is not supported by the great
majority of the cards. This lack of full specification compliance results in discrepancies
in the functionality exposed by different cards. For instance, an applet running fine
in one card, will fail to install and instantiate properly on another card that does not
support one package, class or even an algorithm variant it uses (e.g., EC operations
over large prime fields with 521-bit length ALG EC FP, LENGTH EC FP 521).
Currently, there is no complete list of smartcards and their supported packages and
developers rely primarily on trial and error, and the JCAlgTest survey [5].
On the other hand, manufacturers maintain their own proprietary APIs that pro-
vide solutions to many of those problems. These APIs are vendor-specific and either
provide functionality not exposed by the standard API, or realize hardened and other-
wise extended versions of the algorithms. For example, a commonly provided feature
is operations over elliptic curves, which are allow for the developement of fast imple-
mentations of unsupported cryptographic algorithms. However, proprietary APIs are
typically available to selected customers and only after signing a non-disclosure agree-
ment (NDA) that prevents the publication of any details, information and source code.
3 Low-level Primitive Derivation
In this section, we introduce some generic transformations that can be used to
efficiently derive low-level primitive operations from high-level ones. We provide
transformations for all the operations needed to implement any modern asymmetric
3 https://www.fi.muni.cz/˜xsvenda/jcalgtest/comparative-table.html
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cryptographic algorithm. Our approach assumes that a platform exposes a limited set
of hardware-accelerated high-level operations (e.g., ECDSA signatures) and has some
limited general computation capabilities. In the rest of this section, we focus on two
types of low-level operations: modular arithmetic ones and operations on elliptic curves.
Modular Arithmetic
Modulo operations are central in most cryptographic algorithm implementations. The
main difficulty in implementing such operations in a resource-constrained platform
is the computational load of handling and operating over large numbers. Moreover,
the size of the numbers used in cryptography often exceeds the storage capacity of
the native data types, and thus a specialized BigNumber type must be used. For
simplicity, the rest of this section assumes that the platform exposes a BigNumber
class. In Section 4, we outline how such a class can be implemented in case the
platform does not provide it natively.
Primitive CPU Acceleration Operations
Addition 3 7 -
Subtraction 3 7 -
Negation 3 7 -
Exponentiation 7 3 RSA Decryption
Multiplication 3 3 RSA Decryption
Inversion 3 3 RSA Decryption
EC Point Generation 7 3 EC Key Pair Generation
EC Point Inversion 3 7 Modular Operations
EC Point Addition 3 3 Modular Operations
Scalar-EC Point Multiplication 7 3 EC Diffie-Hellman
Table 2. List of all modular arithmetic and elliptic curve (EC) primitive operations realised
by our transformations, their CPU and hardware-acceleration usage, and the operations
relied on.
As seen in Table 2, simple operations (i.e., addition, subtraction, negation) are
not too computationally intensive and can be handled by the CPU without the use
of any acceleration. On the other hand, multiplication, exponentiation and inversion
require the use of hardware-acceleration. To realise those operations, we use the
“RSA Decryption” routine, which is found in most of the platforms that support
cryptography and is almost always hardware-accelerated. More specifically, we use
the plaintext version of RSA to tunnel computations to the coprocessor, and thus
offload the CPU. For Modular multiplication, the transformation is as straightforward
as simply executing an RSA Decryption. The RSA private key parameter holds the
exponent operand, while the ciphertext and the prime field parameter ones hold
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the base and the modulo operands respectively. As seen in Table 2, no additional
computations are performed on the CPU. A similar approach was also used in [3].
Modular multiplication can be realized in a similar manner. However, the transfor-
mation makes use of both the CPU and the coprocessor as there is no commonly used
cryptographic scheme that directly triggers a hardware-accelerated multiplication.
Instead, as seen in Formula 1, we express multiplication as a series of operations that
are either hardware-accelerated or lightweight-enough for the CPU to execute:
x·y mod p = ((x+y)2−x2−y2)/2 mod p (1)
From these operations, the modular exponentiations are performed on the coprocessor,
while the subtractions, addition and the division by two (i.e., bit shift) are handled by
the CPU. While Modular Inversion may look like a special case of exponentiation, in
many platforms the private key (i.e., exponent) cannot be a negative number. Hence,
RSA Decryption could not be directly used to perform the operation. However, given
that our transformations are geared towards cryptographic applications, we optimize
“inversion” for use with prime moduli. In particular, based on prime field properties
we express the inversion as seen in Equation 2:
x−1 mod p = xp−2 mod p (2)
Hence, at the cost of some generality, we offload the CPU completely. A software-
based solution can still be available for cases where p is not a prime. Finally, we
realize a more specialized low-level operation that solves for r, a congruence of the
form r2 = n (mod p), where p is a prime. This operation is commonly used when
decompressing the coordinates of elliptic curve points. For that, we use the Tonelli
Shanks algorithm [24] [26], and the previously described modular multiplication and
exponentiation operations as building blocks.
Elliptic Curve Arithmetic
Operations over elliptic curves are also essential for most modern cryptographic
algorithms. We provide transformations for four elliptic curve operations: EC Point
Generation, EC Point Inversion, EC Point Addition and Scalar-EC Point Multipli-
cation. Similarly, with above, we also assume a data type capable of storing elliptic
curve (EC) points, while in Section 4, we explain how such a structure can be realised,
when it is not provided natively by the platform.
For the generation of EC Points, we rely on the platform’s Key Pair generation
capabilities. The on-chip EC Key Pair generation uses a hardware random number
generator. The public part of these keys is essentially a random point on the curve.
Alternatively, given that there is a reliable source of randomness generating random
EC points is trivial. The inverse of an EC point P =(x,y) is P−1=(x,−y), which
is also easy to compute. We simply use the modular negation operation derived
previously, to negate the y coordinate. Point addition is more complex and requires
a combination of hardware-accelerated operations and computations on the CPU.
We choose to use the “double & add” algorithm and re-use the modular arithmetic
operations outlined above. However, given that the modular arithmetic operations
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have been realised, any other EC point addition algorithm can also be used. Finally,
the multiplication of a scalar s with a point P can be realized using a hardware-
accelerated version of the EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Agreement protocol. This
protocol is commonly implemented in resource-constrained platforms
and works as follows: Alice and Bob want to agree on a common secret. At first,
they generate their own EC key pairs (a,A) and (b,B) and then share their public
keys A and B respectively. Alice uses the ECDH routine in her platform to compute
a·B, while Bob computes b·A in the same manner. The result of this operation is
their shared secret. In our transformation, we abuse this ECDH call to multiply any
arbitrary s with a P of our choice, and get the result as the “agreed secret”.
4 JCMathLib
We now introduce JCMathLib, a cryptographic library for the JavaCard platform.
JCMathLib extends the standard JavaCard API by realizing various data types,
primitive operations and convenience methods that are currently either not specified
or not available. By providing these operations and data types, JCMathLib enables
developers to implement cryptographic algorithms not supported by the JavaCard
specification. As such, the library focuses not only on provisioning a complete set of
low-level cryptographic primitives necessary for the implementation of many crypto-
graphic algorithms but also on some additional convenience classes. We first provide
an overview of the library’s design and then discuss integration aspects and strategies
used to overcome the platform’s limitations.
4.1 Structure
JCMathLib provides four classes that realize functionality applicable to different use
cases. Some of those classes are outlined in the API specification but are not available
in commercial JavaCards, while others are completely new.
Integer class. The primitive data type int and its wrapper class Integer are listed in
the JC virtual machine specification since 2002 [18] as “optional”. We implemented
the class according to the specification to store a 32-bit signed value along with
methods for addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and modulo operations.
BigNumber class. This class encapsulates a large unsigned value of arbitrary length
and provides methods for performing arithmetic operations on it. The BigNumber
class both complies and extends the API specification. It has flexible internal repre-
sentation capacity [19] and provides methods for: addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, modulo, exponentiation and their modular counterparts for 8-bytes and
longer numbers.
ECCurve class. Stores the parameters of a given elliptic curve and provides a conve-
nient way to handle multiple elliptic curves in a single applet. The class provides calls
for key pair generation over a specific curve and is a dependency of the ECPoint class.
ECPoint class. This class implements an Elliptic Curve Point and provides methods
for point addition, inversion, doubling and scalar multiplication. Similar classes can
only be found in proprietary APIs, as the JC API specification does not define it.
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This class in conjunction with BigNumber enables the implementation of currently
unsupported cryptographic algorithms based on ECC. This class has a dependency
on the ECCurve class.
4.2 Implementation
JCMathLib is comprised of several source code files that implement the classes
outlined above, as well as other complementary methods. It can be loaded into any
JavaCard project as an external package. However, it is advisable that the developer
strips away any unneeded functionality to reduce the size of the final applet.
Technical Details. As seen in Table 2, most of the modular arithmetic operations
rely on the RSA decryption algorithm. To exploit the RSA decryption method,
we first create a PrivateKey object and set its value to be equal to that of the
exponent operand. Then, we initialize a cipher engine for RSA decryption (i.e.,
ALG RSA NOPAD) and pass the base and modulus operands as its parameters. To
store the resulting numbers, we implemented the BigNumber class using arrays of
short variables (i.e., the largest data type natively supported by JavaCard). Similarly,
to store the coordinates of EC Points, we abuse the ECPublicKey class, which is
designed to hold the public part of an EC key pair. To implement the elliptic curve
operations, we mainly rely on the modular arithmetic operations derived above,
except the multiplication of a scalar s with an EC point P . There, we also invoke
ALG EC SVDP DH PLAIN that realizes the EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
protocol. However, due to the design of the method, its output in JavaCard provides
only the x coordinate of the resulting EC point (the y is not returned4). To obtain
the missing y, we use x and solve the Weierstrass equation for y. This gives us two
candidate pointsA=〈x,y〉 andB=〈x,yˆ〉, where y is complementary to yˆ. To determine
which point is the correct one, we extend the transformation to use another hardware-
accelerated method: ECDSA [9]. Using ECDSA, we first sign a dummy plaintext
using s as the private key and then verify the produced signature using A as its public
counterpart. If the verification is successful, then A is the result of the multiplication.
Otherwise, it is B. It should be noted that version JC 3.0.5 introduces a new method
ALG EC SVDP DH PLAIN XY that returns both the x and y coordinates. Once
commercial cards supporting this version become available, our implementation can
be shortened to a single API call resulting in significantly shorter execution time.
Optimizations.
As outlined in Section 3, our transformations rely on existing high-level operations
exposed by the platform. Naturally, this imposes an upper bound on speed, as op-
timizations can reduce the computational load on the slow CPU, but will still rely on
the cryptographic coprocessor’s performance. Figure 1 illustrates the timings of certain
high-level operations, while it also highlights the timing differences between different
cards. Apart from the speed optimizations, memory management in such a con-
strained environment is also cumbersome. Due to the complexity of the cryptographic
4 Compressed elliptic curve points contain the x coordinate in full and the first bit of
coordinate y. During decompression, the two candidates y’s are computed, and the one
that matches the bit is chosen.
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Fig. 1. The measurement of basic operations available via JavaCard public API on six
different smartcards. Every point corresponds to a single operation executed on a particular
smartcard. The JCMathLib operations are then composed of such operations.
operations, JCMathLib needs to use a large number of temporary variables to store
intermediate results. However, in contrast to standard Java programming patterns,
in JavaCard, frequent object allocation introduces an impractically large performance
overhead. Pre-allocating all the temporary objects is not an option either, as the size
of the fast transient memory is very limited. We, therefore, developed a method to
allocate and control a pool of shared memory objects residing in both the transient
and the persistent memory. Through the lock() and unlock() methods, the developer
assigns objects to temporary variables, while our runtime logical checks ensure that
every object is used by only one temporary variable at a time. Optionally, the contents
of a shared object can be automatically erased upon locking or releasing the object to
prevent information leakage. This centralized object management system also allows
for optimal object placement. A developer optimizing for speed can store the objects
in the faster transient memory, while a reduced transient memory footprint can be
achieved through placement in the slower persistent memory. These optimizations sig-
nificantly improved the initial performance of JCMathLib and enabled us to support
a wider range of cards, including some with a limited amount of transient memory.
JavaCard Performance Profiler. Performance profiling of JavaCard code in ap-
plets is a notoriously difficult task. More specifically, as the card environment is build
to protect the stored and processed secrets against an attacker with direct physical
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access, it is difficult to obtain a precise timing trace of the executed code on the
granularity of separate methods or even lines of code.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no open-source performance profiler available
for the JavaCard platform. As the optimizations of JCMathLib required an extensive
analysis, we build a custom performance profiler called JCProfiler. The profiler is
based on the following idea: The source code of an applet is automatically extended
with numerous additional lines of code called “performance traps”. These traps are
capable of prematurely interrupting the applet’s execution when the stop condition
matches their trap ID. Such a trap is inserted to parts relevant for measurement or
after every single line in the applet’s original code for the finest profiling granularity.
Then, the client-side testing application repeatedly executes the applet for all possible
controlling trap IDs. As a result, an increasingly larger chunk of the applet’s code
is covered before the execution is interrupted by the corresponding trap. The time
measurements are collected and processed to estimate the time difference between the
two consecutive traps – resulting in the time required to execute a block of an original
code between these two traps. The intended position of a performance trap is defined by
the developer who manually inserts a trap placeholder in the intended line. JCProfiler
then locates these placeholders, inserts the conditional code with a unique trap ID
and generates the necessary client-side code to trigger all of them. The modified applet
is then compiled and uploaded to the card. After the profiling session, the measured
timings (in milliseconds) are automatically inserted in the applet source as comments
next to the relevant lines. For the profiling to be accurate two pre-conditions must be
met: 1) the measured code needs to be re-entrant and deterministic (i.e., subsequent
executions have the same behavior) and 2) the time required to reach a particular trap
must fluctuate only modestly when repeatedly executed. The reported timings carry
an error that adds up over as more code is covered if these conditions are not satisfied.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we study the performance and security provided by JCMathLib, while
we also discuss other platform and licensing limitations.
Performance Table 3 shows the runtime and the RAM overhead of the core JC-
MathLib operations and structures. We first observe that while there are some timing
and RAM overhead discrepancies between different cards, the measurements are
quite consistent. Moreover, all the BigNumber operations have a very low RAM
overhead (32 bytes), while their runtimes are always smaller than 1000ms. On
the other hand, some of the ECPoint methods exhibit a higher runtime. This
is primarily due to the complexity of the transformations outlined in Sections 3
and 4.2. From these, the most expensive operations are the scalar multiplication,
which takes approximately 4s in some cards and the point addition, which in our
experiments took up to 4s as well. To put these timings into context, accord-
ing to the JCAlgTest performance measurements [5] there are methods in the
standard API with runtimes longer than 9s (e.g., RSA2048 CRT generate). We
also expect the multiplication to be significantly speed-up with the introduction
of ALG EC SVDP DH PLAIN XY as outlined in Section 4.2. Overall, while our
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NXP J2E081 NXP J2D081 G&D S@C6.0
BigNumber operations
add(256b) 7 ms 10 ms 10 ms
subtract(256b) 14 ms 22 ms 11 ms
multiplication(256b) 112 ms 113 ms 117 ms
mod(256b) 30 ms 31 ms 23 ms
mod add(256b, 256b) 71 ms 72 ms 56 ms
mod mult(256b, 256b) 872 ms 855 ms 921 ms
mod exp(2, 256b) 766 ms 697 ms 667 ms
ECPoint operations
randomize(256b) 296 ms 245 ms 503 ms
add(256b) 2995 ms 2892 ms 2747 ms
inversion(256b) 112 ms 109 ms 94 ms
multiplication(256b) 4157 ms 3981 ms 3854 ms
RAM overhead
JCMathLib(256b) 1144 B 1152 B 923 B
new ECPoint(256b) 0* B 0* B 0* B
new BigNumber(256b) 32 B 32 B 32 B
Table 3. JCMathLib operations runtime(ms) and transient RAM overhead (Bytes) on
three different commercials JavaCards. *Counter-intuitively the ECPoint class has no RAM
overhead. This is because the ECPoint class wraps the KeyPair class which is always stored
in persistent EEPROM.
library’s primary goal is to enable code sharing and research and prototyping, its
performance is decent.
Security Hardware implementations are inherently more resilient to physical at-
tacks than software ones. As such, APIs that are implemented purely in hardware
are more robust to power analysis compared to JCMathLib. On the other hand,
proprietary APIs often prevent developers from releasing their code for public se-
curity auditing, as many proprietary API NDAs prohibit any form of public code
sharing. JCMathLib allows developers to replace the proprietary API calls, perform
dynamic analysis (test vectors, fuzzing, etc.) and publish their source code for re-
view.
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Limitations & Licensing JCMathLib is based on the JavaCard 3.0 version with
most modern cards with ECC support expected to be compatible. Moreover, the
ECPublicKey class and the KeyAgreement engine support elliptic curves parameters
expressed in Weierstrass form only. In practice, this is not expected to significantly
affect the applicability of JCMathLib as i) the great majority of commonly used
curves use this form [23] [13], and ii) curves in other forms can often be expressed in
Weierstrass form5. Finally, smartcard RSA engine must accept the public exponent
equal to 2 for the computation to efficiently compute squaring for large numbers.
Apart from these requirements, the library does not come with any other restrictions
and is released under the MIT open source license.
5 Related Work
Despite the limitations of the platform, JavaCards have been utilized in various
applications both in research and production environments. Many of these works use
smartcards as a secure element, while others aim to scrutinize the security features
of the platform.
Applications. Many other works utilize the security features of the platform to
realize new algorithms enabling new use cases and applications. The authors in [21]
use JavaCards to store election secrets in a distributed manner. For this purpose, they
developed an applet realizing ElGamal encryption and Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
However, as the JavaCard API provides no support for these algorithms, they had to
abuse the API to realize the necessary functionality in a hybrid fashion. [14] uses an
array of JavaCards originating from different manufacturers to realize an architecture
resilient to backdoors and hardware trojans. Their prototype features few hundreds
of JavaCards loaded with an applet realizing distributed protocols for essential
cryptographic operations (i.e., key generation, decryption, signing). A software re-
implementation of various cryptographic algorithms for the JavaCard platform is
provided in [28], optimized for performance and low memory footprint. A follow-up
work [11] benchmarks the speed of various basic cryptographic operations on different
smartcards. In other works, JavaCard is used as an embedded secure element to make
the device self-authenticable and add near-field communication (NFC) capabilities [6].
Furthermore, in [3] Bichsel et al. design and implement a lightweight anonymous
credential system suitable for secure identity tokens. Even though they were using
an older JavaCard version (2.2.1), they achieve transaction times that are orders of
magnitudes faster than those of prior works. Other studies focus on more recent use
cases such as securing bitcoin transactions/storage [27] and homogenizing the Web of
Things [12]. However, in some cases, the limitations of the JavaCard platform were
impossible to overcome. For instance, Mostowski et al. [20] developed a lightweight
anonymous credentials protocol suitable for devices with low computational power.
Even though JavaCard hardware was sufficient for their protocols, they opted to use
MULTOS which is less widespread and without publicly available SDK. Their main
motivation was that MULTOS provides direct access to the underlying hardware
and low-level cryptographic operations, while the JavaCard API does not.
5 https://github.com/david-oswald/jc_curve25519
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Third-party Libraries. There is also a smaller category of works aiming to extend
the JC API with low-level primitives. The most known project is OV-Chip 2.0 [25]
which implement the BigNat library to provide big integer functionality for JavaCards.
However, the library is developed with the OV-chipkaart in mind, and its mainte-
nance has seized for more than eight years. E-verification2 [21] featured a class that
provides capabilities similar to those of the Java BigInteger. Unfortunately, it was
never released as a standalone library, and the development stopped in 2012. Finally,
the JCMath library [4] aimed to enable operations over large numbers in JavaCard,
but it is neither maintained nor has any documentation available. The underlying
coprocessor for fast modular multiplication was utilized for fast implementation of
quantum-computer resistant Kyber algorithm [1] on smartcards; however, a low-level
proprietary API was used and a working research prototype was not released.
6 Conclusions
This paper identifies multiple issues that hinder the adoption of the JavaCard platform
in new use cases, and proposes techniques to alleviate them. We first introduce a
set of transformations that exploit existing high-level functionality to reconstruct
missing low-level primitive operations. These transformations are geared towards
resource-constrained platforms and try to offload the CPU by utilizing any hardware-
acceleration components that may be available. We then use them to implement
JCMathLib, a library, that realizes both new features and already specified primitives
that are not available in commercial JavaCards. Our library provides developers with
the necessary classes and methods (e.g., BigNumber operations, Elliptic Curve Point
operations) to implement cryptographic algorithms not supported by the JC API.
This, for the first time, enables the rapid adoption of new algorithms, decreases the
impact of the manufacturer compliance issues and makes the JavaCard platform a
suitable candidate for previously unsupported applications.
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